Zitat

A Sky Work Airlines de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration HB-JGA performing flight SRK-172 from Palma Mallorca,SP (Spain) to Berne (Switzerland) with 62 passengers and 5 crew, was offered a visual approach to active runway 32, the crew under supervision however opted for a visual approach to runway 14 despite an ATC advise to expect tailwind on that approach. During the landing flare the crew observed too high a sinkrate, the pilot flying increased the pitch angle resulting in the tail of the airplane contacting the runway first. The airplane rolled out normally and taxied to the gate, where the passengers disembarked. One flight attendant and one passenger received minor injuries, the aircraft received substantial damage. Emergency services did not respond.

The Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (BFU) released their final report into the accident concluding:

The accident is attributable to the fact that the aircraft touched the runway with the aft fuselage first because the crew reacted to a high sink rate by a too high pitch attitude rather than by a power increase. Fatigue may have contributed to the development of the accident.

The flight crew consisted of a captain under supervision occupying the left hand seat, who was pilot flying (PF) for the flight, and a training captain in the right hand seat assuming the role of the pilot monitoring (PNF). A first officer (FO) under supervision occupied the observer's seat and was responsible to handle the radio communication.

The flight had been without event until the crew descended through about 15200 feet and contact Bern approach control. ATC offered a visual approach runway 32 indicating winds from 310 degrees at 3 to 6 knots. The training captain got visual with the runway and pointed the runway out, so that the crew opted for a visual approach to runway 14. The approach controller cleared the flight: ""Skyfox one seven two cleared for the visual approach runway one four descend initially flight level eight zero", but did not challenge the incorrect read back runway 32 in "Cleared to visual runway three two and er initial climb er descend eight zero Skyfox one seven two".

The airplane got subsequently cleared down to 6000 feet, but flew through the extended centerline of runway 14, when the air traffic controller instructed the flight to perform a wide approach to permit for an IFR departure from runway 14. Shortly thereafter the autopilot was disconnected, the crew did however not mention the disconnect, the disconnect aural warning sounded twice.

The PF asked, whether the PNF had the runway in sight, which was replied to in the negative, the FO suggesting they needed to turn left towards the runway. At that time ATC cleared the flight to turn base, the crew needed to request vectors and was told to turn left onto a heading of 220. The PNF now suggested to reengage the autopilot, which was accepted by the PF. Descending through 5800 feet about 15nm from touch down all crew gained visual contact with the aerodrome. The autopilot was disconnected again, the aural alert sounded once, the crew did not mention the disconnect.

The airplane was handed off to the tower, when a sound similiar to a mobile phone sounded in the cockpit, the PNF/training captain responding he had his mobile phone on. The tower cleared the crew to land on runway 14 winds from 310 degrees at 5 knots maximum 8 knots.

Descending through 1000 feet AGL the airplane had been completely configured for landing with 35 degrees of flaps, indicated airspeed was 122 knots.

The power setting remained virutally unchanged between 750 feet and 150 feet AGL, subsequently a continuous power reduction began. At 50 feet AGL the crew noticed an increasing sink rate, the training captain/PNF calling with emphasis "nose up". A sink rate of just under 1000 fpm was maintained until about 30 feet AGL with the pitch attitude increasing from 0.7 degrees nose down to 8.17 degrees nose up within 3 seconds.

In postflight interviews the training captain stated, that he had initially helped the pitch up by lightly pulling on the control column, but then used both hands to prevent the control column being pulled further back, the pilot flying however pulling the column fully back despite his pressure.

The captain under supervision said, that the training captain had pulled the column fully back. The first officer also stated, that the column was pulled fully back by the training captain with both hands.

The airplane contacted the runway tail first at an attitude of 8.17 degrees nose up resulting in a vertical acceleration of 2.58G. Half a second the main gear touched down, 3 more seconds later the nose wheels. The tail strike indication illuminated in the cockpit. The tower controller had not noticed the hard landing and tail strike and provided a normal taxi clearance. The airplane shut down normally at the stand, the passengers disembarked.

As result of the tail strike all structural parts and skin panels had to be replaced in the tail area. Tail scrape marks with metallic particles of the airplane embedded in the runway surface were visible about 1 meter left of the runway centerline over a distance of 8 meters.

The training captain had 6564 hours of flying experience, thereof 3550 hours as instructor. He had 310 hours on type and thereof 125 hours as instructor on type.

The captain under supervision had 3744 hours total flying experience thereof 544 hours as commander. He had a total of 30 landings on the accident type.

The captain under supervision said in a post flgiht interview: "At the beginning of the final approach, I have asked Mr. [name of the training captain] to help me during the approach, to give me instructions, to talk me down, because I knew that I did not have much experience at that time. Mentally, I handed over the aircraft to him. I relied on his advices. During the approach this has gone well: he gave me instructions. (…) I have decidedly entrusted to him all the responsibility for the approach and landing and asked him explicitly for help." While the cockpit voice recorder did not contain such a request, the BFU assumes from many remarks on the CVR, that such a request had been made before the available CVR recording began. The BFU annotated: "Such an attitude of a qualified commander, who only was under supervision regarding aircraft specific aspects, can not be understood."

The aircraft manual states, that if the sink rate is higher than desired, power will be required in the landing flare through touch down. The manual specifically states, that pitch angles above 6 degrees must be avoided and sink rate should not be controlled by increasing the pitch angle. At aerodromes at 5000 feet MSL or above it may be necessary to not bring the power back to idle until after touch down.

The BFU annotated, the crew planning for both pilots by the operator must be described as inappropriate.

The Sky Work Airlines manual did not contain the call outs for pitch attitudes as described by the airplane manufacturer's manual requiring the PNF to call out pitch attitudes to warn of high pitch attitudes during landing.